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EU CITIZENSHIP AND DEMOCRACY
Koen Lenaerts*
As ‘the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’,1 EU citizenship refl ects 
the idea that the process of European integration must be not only in the hands of the 
Member States but also in those of the peoples of Europe.2
In that sense, it contributes to the democratisation of the EU. Th at is why any EU 
citizen is entitled to have his say in the governance of the European Union. In that 
regard, Article  22(2) TFEU provides that every EU citizen residing in a Member 
State of which he is not a national is to have the right to vote and to stand as a 
candidate in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he 
resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. Moreover, any EU 
citizen has, in accordance with Article 24 TFEU, the right to hold the EU institutions 
to account, notably by addressing questions to them in any of the offi  cial Treaty 
languages and by obtaining a reply in the same language. Likewise, that Treaty 
provision also states that EU citizens enjoy the right to petition the European 
Parliament in accordance with Article  227 TFEU and the right to apply to the 
Ombudsman in accordance with Article  228 TFEU.3 In addition, whilst EU 
governance is based on representative democracy,4 the authors of the Treaty of 
Lisbon decided to incorporate into the EU legal order a form of participatory 
democracy. In that regard, the fi rst paragraph of Article 24 TFEU provides that the 
European Parliament and the Council shall adopt a regulation laying down the 
* President of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and Professor of European Union Law, 
University of Leuven. All opinions expressed herein are strictly personal to the author. Th is 
article is based on the speech given on 14  September 2015, at the Conference entitled ‘EU 
Citizenship and Justice’ organised under the auspices of the 12th Luxembourg Presidency of the 
Council of the EU.
1 See, e.g., Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk, EU:C:2001:458, para. 31; Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R, 
EU:C:2002:493, para. 82; Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello, EU:C:2003:539, para. 22; Case C-200/02 Zhu 
and Chen, EU:C:2004:639, para. 25; Case C-135/08 Rottmann, EU:C:2010:104, para. 43; Case 
C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano, EU:C:2011:124, para. 41; Case C-434/09 McCarthy, EU:C:2011:277, para. 
47; Case C-256/11 Dereci and Others, EU:C:2011:734, para. 62, and Joined Cases C-356/11 and 
C-357/11 O. and Others, EU:C:2012:776, para. 44.
2 See Article 10 TEU.
3 See Case C-261/13 P Schönberger v Parliament, EU:C:2014:2423.
4 Article  10(1) TEU states that ‘[t]he functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative 
democracy’.
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procedures and conditions required for a citizens’ initiative within the meaning of 
Article 11 [TEU].5
However, a close look to the new Treaty provisions on democratic principles and 
at the Treaty provisions on the European Parliament reveals that the political 
dimension of EU citizenship is not limited to the political rights attaching to the 
status of EU citizen.6 Th is is because those rights do not fully capture the link between 
EU citizenship and the democratic governance of the EU. Respect for the principle of 
representative democracy on which the functioning of the EU is founded requires 
both the EU institutions and the Member States to fulfi l democratic obligations that 
are to be found not only in Articles  20(2), 22(2) and 24 TFEU, but also in other 
provisions of the Treaties and secondary EU law that relate to the democratic 
governance of the EU. In fulfi lling those obligations, the EU institutions and the 
Member States must comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (the ‘Charter’), including the provisions thereof that relate to EU citizenship7 
but do not correspond to the rights listed in Articles 20(2), 22(2) and 24 TFEU.
Looking at the seminal ruling of the European Court of Justice (the ‘ECJ’) in 
Delvigne,8 the present contribution is to shed some light on the link between EU 
citizenship and the democratic governance of the EU.9 To that end, it is divided into 
three parts. Part I is devoted to examining that case. For present purposes, Delvigne 
contains two main fi ndings. First, the ECJ made, for the fi rst time, explicit the link 
between EU citizenship and EU representative democracy. Second, it rejected a broad 
interpretation of Article 20(2)(b) TFEU. In so doing, the ECJ refused to support the 
view that fundamental rights may be incorporated into the political rights attaching to 
the status of EU citizen by means of judicial interpretation. Exploring further this 
second fi nding, Part II is to provide additional constitutional arguments militating 
against such incorporation. Last but not least, a brief conclusion supports the contention 
that, as interpreted in Delvigne, the political dimension of EU citizenship is respectful 
of the constitutional allocation of powers sought by the authors of the Treaties.
5 Article 11(4) TEU states that ‘[n]ot less than one million citizens who are nationals of a signifi cant 
number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the 
framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a 
legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’. As to the regulation to 
which the fi rst paragraph of Article 24 TFEU refers, see Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on the citizens’ initiative, [2011] OJ L 65/1.
6 As to the Treaty provisions that list the rights attaching to the status of EU citizen, see Articles 20 to 
25 TFEU. As to the Treaty provisions on democratic principles, see Articles 9 to 12 TEU. As to the 
Treaty provisions on the European Parliament, see Article 14 TEU and Articles 223 to 234 TFEU. 
See A. Schrauwen, ‘European Union Citizenship in the Treaty of Lisbon: Any Change at All?’ (2008) 
15 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 55, p.  56 (noting that ‘the political 
dimension refers to how [EU] citizens participate in the EU decision-making structure, to the way 
in which the [EU] should treat its citizens and to how the [EU] citizens can legitimize the [EU]’).
7 See Title V of the Charter.
8 Case C-650/13 Delvigne, EU:C:2015:648.
9 See L. Khadar and J. Shaw, Article 39 of the Charter, in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner and A. Ward (eds), 
Th e EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014) 1027, p. 1038.
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1. LINKING EU CITIZENSHIP TO EU REPRESENTATIVE 
DEMOCRACY
As political actors, EU citizens are called upon to play an important role in the 
democratic functioning of the EU. Th is follows from the Treaty provisions on 
‘democratic principles’ newly introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. Notably, Article 10(3) 
TEU states that ‘[e]very citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life 
of the Union’. Th at participation is primarily carried out by means of electing the 
members of the European Parliament who are democratically entrusted with the 
representation of the interests of EU citizens. As Article 10(2) TEU provides, ‘[EU] 
[c]itizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament’. Th e 
direct democratic mandate with which EU citizens vest members of the European 
Parliament was made crystal clear by the authors of the Treaty of Lisbon who decided 
to abandon the wording of ex Article  189 EC. Whilst the latter Treaty provision 
referred to the members of the European Parliament as ‘representatives of the peoples 
of the States brought together in the Community’, Article 14(2) TEU refers to them as 
‘representatives of the Union’s citizens’.10 In order to facilitate the democratic 
participation and representation of EU citizens at EU level, EU law imposes obligations 
on both the EU institutions and the Member States.
As to the EU institutions, they must, for example, give citizens and representative 
associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all 
fi elds of EU activity. Th ey also have the obligation to take decisions as openly and as 
close as possible to the citizen. In particular, the principle of transparency enables EU 
citizens to participate fully in the EU decision-making process. By having access to 
adequate information on the decisions adopted by the EU legislator and by the EU 
administration, EU citizens may engage in a discussion as to whether they agree or 
disagree with those decisions. At the same time, transparency enhances the legitimacy 
of the EU institutions, given that their actions (or their failures to act) are open to public 
scrutiny.11 Th e right of access to documents gives concrete expression to that principle.12
10 See Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-650/13 Delvigne, EU:C:2015:363, para. 100.
11 See Case C-615/13 P ClientEarth and PAN Europe v EFSA, EU:C:2015:489, para. 56 (‘[t]he transparency 
of the process followed by [an EU] public authority for the adoption of [an EU] measure contributes 
to that authority acquiring greater legitimacy in the eyes of the persons to whom that measure is 
addressed and increasing their confi dence in that authority […] and to ensuring that the authority is 
more accountable to citizens in a democratic system’). See also Joined Cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P 
Sweden and Turco v Council, EU:C:2008:374, paras 45 and 59; Case C-506/08 P Sweden v MyTravel and 
Commission, EU:C:2011:496, para. 113; Case-C 280/11 P Council v Access Info Europe, EU:C:2013:671, 
para. 32; and Case C-350/12 P Council v in’t Veld, EU:C:2014:2039, paras 53, 106 and 107.
12 See, e.g., Joined Cases C-39/05  P and C-52/05  P Sweden and Turco v Council, EU:C:2008:374, 
para.  34; Joined Cases C-514/07  P, C-528/07  P and C-532/07  P Sweden and Others v API and 
Commission, EU:C:2010:541, para. 68; and Case C-506/08 P Sweden v MyTravel and Commission, 
EU:C:2011:496, para. 72. See also K. Lenaerts, ‘Th e principle of democracy in the case law of Th e 
European Court of Justice’ (2013) 62 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 271, p. 300.
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In addition, whilst the functioning of the EU is founded on representative 
democracy, it also allows EU citizens, acting collectively, to take the initiative to 
propose EU legislation.13 Furthermore, it allows room for alternative forms of 
governance in certain fi elds, such as the adoption of norms that are the product of a 
social dialogue at EU level.14
As to the Member States, Article 22(2) TFEU, which contains the legal basis for the 
adoption of detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right set out in Article 20(2)
(b) TFEU, states that EU citizens are to be free from any discrimination on grounds of 
nationality when they exercise their right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections 
to the European Parliament. In Eman and Sevinger, the ECJ explicitly held that ‘Article 
[22(2) TFEU] is confi ned to applying the principle of non-discrimination on grounds 
of nationality to [the] right to vote and [to] stand [as a candidate in elections to the 
European Parliament], by stipulating that every citizen of the Union residing in a 
Member State of which he is not a national is to have [that right] in the Member State 
in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State’.15
In that regard, the question that arises is whether EU law imposes on the Member 
States other obligations with regard to the participation and representation of EU citizens 
in the governance of the EU, notably by guaranteeing the right to vote and to stand as a 
candidate in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State of which the EU 
citizen is a national. Th e ECJ was confronted with that very question in Delvigne.16
Th e facts of that case are as follows. In 1988, Mr Delvigne – a French national 
residing in France – was sentenced to a 12 years’ imprisonment for the crime of 
murder. As an ancillary consequence of that sentence, French criminal law provided 
that persons in Mr Delvigne’s situation were deprived of their right to vote. In 2012, 
French authorities decided, in application of the French Electoral Code and French 
criminal law, to exclude Mr Delvigne from the electoral roll. He challenged that 
decision before the referring court which asked, in essence, whether Article 39 of the 
Charter had to be interpreted as precluding such exclusion.
At the outset, the ECJ examined whether the relevant provisions of French law on 
the basis of which Mr Delvigne was excluded from the electoral roll ‘implemented EU 
law’ within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter. In that regard, the ECJ noted 
that Article 8 of the 1976 Act concerning the elections of members to the European 
Parliament (the ‘1976 Act’) states that ‘[s]ubject to the provisions of this Act, the 
electoral procedure shall be governed in each Member State by its national provisions’.17
13 See, in this regard, Case T-450/12 Anagnostakis v Commission, EU:T:2015:739 and Case C-589/15 P 
Anagnostakis v Commission (pending).
14 K. Lenaerts, above n 12, p. 298. See Case T-135/96 UEAPME v Council, EU:T:1998:128.
15 Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger, EU:C:2006:545, para. 53 (emphasis added).
16 Case C-650/13 Delvigne, EU:C:2015:648.
17 Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suff rage, 
annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976, [1976] OJ L 278/1, 
as amended by Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom of 25 June 2002 and 23 September 2002, 
[2002] OJ L 283/1.
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Referring to its previous case-law,18 it held that Articles 1(3) and 8 of the 1976 Act 
do not defi ne, expressly and precisely, who is entitled to vote and to stand as a candidate 
in elections to the European Parliament. Th at is a competence that remains with the 
Member States.19
However, Member States must, when exercising that competence, fulfi l their 
obligation under Article 1(3) of the 1976 Act, read in conjunction with Article 14(3) 
TEU, according to which ‘[t]he members of the European Parliament shall be elected 
for a term of fi ve years by direct universal suff rage in a free and secret ballot’.20 Th e 
ECJ reasoned that a Member State is fulfi lling its obligations under those provisions 
when it adopts legislation to that eff ect even where the latter deprives an EU citizen of 
his right to vote in the elections to the European Parliament. In so doing, such a 
Member State is implementing EU law within the meaning of Article  51(1) of the 
Charter.21
Next, the ECJ examined which of the two paragraphs of Article 39 of the Charter 
applied to the case at hand.22 In the light of the explanations relating to that provision 
of the Charter,23 it noted that, whilst Article 39(1) of the Charter corresponds to the 
right guaranteed in Article 20(2)(b) TFEU,24 Article 39(2) of the Charter corresponds 
to Article 14(3) TEU. Th ose explanations also state that ‘Article 39(2) takes over the 
basic principles of the electoral system in a democratic State.’ In accordance with 
Article 52(2) of the Charter,25 the ECJ held that, since Article 20(2)(b) TFEU was not 
applicable to a situation such as that of Mr Delvigne, the same applied to Article 39(1) 
of the Charter.26 Th us, the compatibility with EU law of the French legislation at issue 
had to be examined in the light of Article 39(2) of the Charter.
18 Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger, EU:C:2006:545, paras 43 and 45, and Case C-145/04 Spain v 
United Kingdom, EU:C:2006:543, paras 70 and 78.
19 Case C-650/13 Delvigne, EU:C:2015:648, para. 31.
20 Ibid., para. 32.
21 Ibid., para. 33.
22 Article  39 of the Charter, entitled ‘Right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the 
European Parliament’, states that:
 ‘1. Every citizen of the Union has the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the 
European Parliament in the Member State in which he or she resides, under the same conditions as 
nationals of that State.
 2. Members of the European Parliament shall be elected by direct universal suff rage in a free and 
secret ballot.’
23 See the explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, [2007] OJ C 303/17 (‘the 
explanations relating to the Charter’).
24 It is worth noting that the explanations relating to Article 39(1) of the Charter state that Article 22 
TFEU contains the legal basis for the adoption of detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right 
set out in Article 20(2)(b) TFEU.
25 Article 52(2) of the Charter states that ‘[r]ights recognised by this Charter for which provision is 
made in the Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defi ned by those 
Treaties’.
26 Case C-650/13 Delvigne, EU:C:2015:648, paras 42 and 43.
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Once it had been established that the French legislation at issue constituted a 
limitation on the exercise of the right to vote in elections to the European Parliament 
as provided for in Article 39(2) of the Charter, the ECJ went on to determine whether 
such a limitation complied with the requirements laid down in Article 52(1) of the 
Charter. Th e ECJ observed that it did, since the exclusion to which Mr Delvigne was 
subject was provided for by law,27 respected the essence of that right,28 pursued a 
legitimate objective and complied with the principle of proportionality.29
Delvigne is an important development in the case law of the ECJ. It has helped to 
make explicit the link between EU citizenship and the democratic governance of the 
EU. It shows that the political dimension of EU citizenship is not limited to Articles 20 
to 25 TFEU, but also involves other provisions of EU law, notably Article 14(3) TEU 
and Article  1(3) of the 1976 Act.30 Th ose provisions impose on the Member States 
obligations whose objective is to ensure that the basic principles inherent in a 
democratic electoral system are applied at EU level. In addition, Delvigne supports the 
view that fundamental rights may not be incorporated into the substantive rights 
attaching to the status of EU citizen by means of judicial interpretation. Th e scope 
ratione personae of Article 20(2)(b) TFEU was left  untouched. Rather, in fulfi lling the 
obligations imposed by Article  14(3) TEU and the 1976 Act, Member States must 
comply with the Charter, in particular with the provisions set out under its Title V 
that do not correspond to the rights listed in Article 20(2) TFEU.
2. THE INCORPORATION OF RIGHTS OTHER THAN 
THOSE LISTED IN ARTICLE 20(2) TFEU
It follows from the ruling of the ECJ in Delvigne that fundamental rights may not be 
‘incorporated’ into the political rights attaching to the status of EU citizen. Otherwise, 
the system of fundamental rights protection under EU law would serve as a 
‘federalising device’, since those rights would apply on a ‘free-standing’ basis, i.e. 
regardless of whether the national measure at issue adversely aff ects the rights 
attaching to that status.31 In order for a national measure to fall within the scope of 
those rights, it would then suffi  ce for that measure to infringe any fundamental right 
recognised in the Charter.
27 Ibid., para. 47.
28 Ibid., para. 48.
29 Ibid., paras 49–51.
30 See, in this regard, H. van Eijken and J.W. van Rossem, ‘Prisoner disenfranchisement and the right 
to vote in elections to the European Parliament: Universal suff rage key to unlocking political 
citizenship?’ (2016) 12 European Constitutional Law Review 114, p. 127 (holding that ‘Delvigne is an 
important judgment, which strengthens the political dimension of EU citizenship’).
31 See K. Lenaerts, ‘Th e concept of EU citizenship in the case law of the European Court of Justice’ 
(2012) 13 ERA Forum 569, pp. 577–579.
aa
n
ge
bo
de
n 
do
or
/p
ré
se
nt
é 
pa
r
aangeboden door/présenté par
Ju
ris
qu
ar
e
Jurisquare
Curia (80.246.106.4)
EU Citizenship and Democracy
Éditions Larcier - © Groupe Larcier
Koen Lenaerts
170 Intersentia
One can draw important lessons from the US constitutional experience.32 In the 
US, the Bill of Rights set out in the Federal Constitution has operated as a centripetal 
force which protects individuals from the illegitimate interference of public power, 
whether of federal or state origin.33 Th us, the Privileges or Immunities Clause and, 
notably, the Due Process Clause of the XIVth Amendment have served as the gateway 
for the application of the Bill of Rights to the American States.34 According to some 
scholars, Article 20 TFEU could likewise provide the legal basis for an EU variant of 
the incorporation doctrine,35 as this Treaty provision, having stated that ‘[c]itizens of 
the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the 
Treaties’, goes on to enumerate those rights on a non-exhaustive basis. Th e argument 
then runs that the status of EU citizen contains more rights than those set out in 
Articles 21 to 24 TFEU so that, emulating the US Supreme Court, the ECJ should rely 
on Article 20 TFEU with a view to attaching fundamental rights to that status.
In that regard, some scholars have advocated a ‘reverse Solange doctrine’ according 
to which national measures that do not implement EU law fall outside the scope of 
that law as long as they do not constitute systemic violations of fundamental rights. 
Where, however, national measures do give rise to such systemic violations, those 
scholars argue that, by virtue of the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship, EU citizens 
enjoy a judicially enforceable EU law right to protection from those violations, 
regardless of whether they move or remain in their Member State of origin.36 Th at 
would create ‘a common minimum level of fundamental rights protection throughout 
the EU’. Th e idea would thus be to protect not only the individual but also the 
‘constitutional core’ of the EU which comprises, at the very least, the values set out in 
Article 2 TEU.
However, such an incorporation doctrine “à l’européenne”, even if limited to 
‘systemic violations’, would mean that fundamental rights protection under EU law 
32 See also K. Lenaerts, ‘Fundamental rights in the European Union’ (2000) 25 European Law Review 
575.
33 Th e Bill of Rights (Ist to Xth Amendments of the US Constitution) was originally conceived as a limit 
on the powers of the federal government but not those of the American States. Th e reason was that 
the majority of the founding fathers believed that the application of the Bill of Rights to the 
American States would give leverage to the federal government to encroach upon State powers not 
transferred to the Union. See, generally, E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, 4th Ed (New York, 
Kluwer, 2011). For an excellent study on US-EU comparative law regarding fundamental rights, see 
A. Knook, ‘Th e Court, the Charter, and the vertical division of powers in the European Union’ 
(2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 367.
34 Th e Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Due Process Clause read as follows: ‘No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law’.
35 In favour of applying the US incorporation doctrine to an EU context, see M. van den Brink, ‘EU 
Citizenship and EU Fundamental Rights: Taking EU Citizenship Rights Seriously?’ (2012) 39 Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration 273, pp. 287 – 288 (who advocates following the example of the US 
Supreme Court, whilst allowing Member States to opt for a higher level of protection).
36 A. von Bogdandy et al., ‘Reverse Solange – Protecting the Essence of Fundamental Rights Against 
EU Member States’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 489.
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would apply to national measures falling outside the scope of application of EU law, 
thus having the same scope as that of national constitutions or of the ECHR. Th at 
outcome would be incompatible with the principle of conferral, as it adversely aff ects 
the allocation of powers between the EU and its Member States sought by the authors 
of the Treaties.37
It is worth recalling that the principle of conferral aff ects the exercise of powers 
within the EU in two diff erent but related ways. On the one hand, it limits the fi elds in 
which EU action can be undertaken.38 On the other hand, it ensures that the EU will 
refrain from acting in a way that renders the powers retained by the Member States 
devoid of substance.39 If, however, all national measures, regardless of their 
substantive link to EU law, had to pass muster under the Charter, that would seriously 
undermine the powers retained by the Member States, notwithstanding the principle 
of conferral.40
As I have explained elsewhere, the Charter is the ‘shadow’ of EU law. Just as an 
object defi nes the contours of its shadow, the scope of EU law determines that of the 
Charter.41 Article 51(1) of the Charter must be interpreted as meaning that it is the 
scope of EU law that defi nes that of the Charter, and not the other way around.42 An 
incorporation doctrine “à l’européenne” is simply incompatible with the rationale 
underpinning Article 51(1) of the Charter, by virtue of which recourse to fundamental 
rights cannot be invoked to broaden the substantive scope of EU law. Th at said, that 
incompatibility does not, however, rule out the possibility that other provisions of EU 
law may give rise to obligations on the Member States that relate to the political 
dimension of EU citizenship but are not set out in Articles 20(2), 22(2) and 24 TFEU. 
37 Referring to the Opinion of AG Sharpston in Ruiz Zambrano, see P.Van Elsuwege, ‘Shift ing the 
Boundaries? European Union Citizenship and the Scope of Application of EU Law – Case No. 
C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Offi  ce national de l’emploi’ (2011) 38 Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration 263, p. 267 (who argues that ‘this proposal suggests a Copernican revolution within the 
EU’s legal and political system, comparable to the impact of Gitlow v. New York on American 
constitutional law’).
38 See Article 5(2) TEU: ‘Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of 
the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set 
out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member 
States’.
39 See Article 4(1) TEU: ‘[i]n accordance with Article 5 [TEU], competences not conferred upon the 
Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States’.
40 However, see M.J. van den Brink, above n 35, p. 283, who posits that ‘it is […] not the Charter but EU 
citizenship that has changed the fi eld of application of Union law. Since EU fundamental rights 
could always be applied in situations falling within the scope of Union law, they would still be 
applicable if EU citizenship extends the scope of EU law’. However, in my view, this argument is 
circular given that it is by having recourse to the Charter that new rights attaching to the status of 
citizen of the Union would be created, hence expanding the scope of application of EU law.
41 K. Lenaerts and J.A. Gutiérrez–Fons, ‘Th e Place of the Charter in the EU Constitutional Edifi ce’ in 
S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner and A. Ward (eds), Th e EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A 
Commentary (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014) 1557, pp. 1567–1568.
42 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105, para. 19.
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In fulfi lling those EU law obligations, the Member States must, of course, comply with 
the Charter.43
Article 52(2) of the Charter, which states that ‘[r]ights recognised by [the] Charter 
for which provision is made in the Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions 
and within the limits defi ned by those Treaties’, also opposes an incorporation 
doctrine “à l’européenne”. In that regard, the explanations relating to that Article of 
the Charter, which expressly mention ‘the rights derived from Union citizenship’, 
state that ‘[t]he Charter does not alter the system of rights conferred by the EC Treaty 
and taken over by the Treaties’. Th is means that the Charter may not be relied upon as 
a device which expands or grants new rights to EU citizens. Th is was actually what the 
ECJ did in Delvigne: compliance with Article  52(2) of the Charter means that the 
scope of Article 20(2)(b) TFEU determines that of Article 39(1) of the Charter. Since 
the former provision did not apply to a situation such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings, the latter did not apply either.44 Conversely, given that Article  14(3) 
TEU applied to the case at hand, the same held true for Article 39(2) of the Charter. As 
mentioned above, it is thus the Treaty provision that corresponds to a fundamental 
right recognised in the Charter that determines the scope of application of that 
fundamental right, and not the other way around.45
Furthermore, the incorporation of fundamental rights into the status of EU citizen 
may not be judicially driven, since Article  25(2) TFEU clearly states that ‘without 
prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties, the Council, acting unanimously in 
accordance with a special legislative procedure and aft er obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament, may adopt provisions to strengthen or to add to the rights listed 
in Article 20(2) [TFEU]. Th ese provisions shall enter into force aft er their approval by 
the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’. It 
follows that Article  25(2) TFEU incorporates a double ‘political safeguard of 
federalism’.46 First, it safeguards Member States as a whole, since unanimity voting is 
required within the Council. Second, Article  25(2) TFEU also protects national 
parliaments and even the peoples of Europe themselves where their consent to such 
measures is required by their national constitution. Additionally, Article 25(2) TFEU 
applies ‘without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties’, notably Article 6(1) 
TEU which states that ‘[t]he provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the 
competences of the Union as defi ned in the Treaties’. Accordingly, the political 
43 Case C-650/13 Delvigne, EU:C:2015:648, para. 33.
44 Ibid., paras 40 to 43.
45 Th e fact that the wording of Article 39(2) of the Charter and that of Article 14(3) TEU are – with the 
exception of the expression ‘for a term of fi ve years’ – identical has no bearing in that regard. Since 
the decisive factor in Delvigne was that Article 14(3) TEU applied to the case at hand, the reasoning 
of the ECJ was not circular. Cf. A. Kornezov, ‘Case Comment: Th e right to vote as an EU fundamental 
right and the expanding scope of application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2016) 75 
Cambridge Law Journal 24, p. 27.
46 Term borrowed from H. Wechsler, ‘Th e Political Safeguards of Federalism: Th e Ro1e of the States in 
the Composition and Selection of the National Government’ (1954) 54 Columbia Law Review 543.
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incorporation of new rights (or the strengthening of the rights already listed in 
Article  20(2) TFEU) to the status of EU citizen would have to comply with the 
prohibition laid down in Article 6(1) TEU.
An incorporation doctrine would also be inconsistent with the objectives sought 
by the authors of the Treaties. In particular, it would run counter to the fact that, in 
accordance with Article 4(2) TEU, the EU is committed to respecting the national 
identity of the Member States, of which national constitutional arrangements are part 
and parcel.47 An incorporation doctrine “à l’européenne” would inevitably face 
opposition from national constitutional courts which would undermine the legitimacy 
of the ECJ. Even if limited to systemic failures, it would send the message that national 
constitutional courts are unable to fulfi l the very mission for which they were created, 
i.e. to protect a sphere of self-determination at national level free from public 
interference. Since the relationship between the ECJ and national courts is based not 
on hierarchy but on cooperation and mutual respect, any breakdown in trust will lead 
not to submissive obedience on the part of national constitutional courts, but rather 
to resistance and confl ict.48 Outside the scope of application of EU law, the authors of 
the Treaties have entrusted the EU’s political institutions, not the ECJ, with the task of 
monitoring whether ‘there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the 
values referred to in Article 2 [TEU]’. In accordance with Article 269 TFEU, the role 
of the ECJ is, by contrast, limited to verifying that the procedural stipulations laid 
down in Article 7 TEU have been met.
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Th e ruling of the ECJ in Delvigne demonstrates that the political dimension of EU 
citizenship is not fully captured by the political rights attaching to the status of EU 
citizen. Respect for the principle of representative democracy may require both the 
EU institutions and the Member States to fulfi l obligations that are not to be found in 
Articles 20(2), 22(2) and 24 TFEU, but in other provisions of EU law that give concrete 
expression to democratic principles. Th ose obligations may seek to incorporate into 
the EU legal order basic electoral principles that are part and parcel of European 
democracies.49
Notably, by virtue of those electoral principles, the Member States are bound to 
ensure that members of the European Parliament are elected by direct universal 
47 See Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein, EU:C:2010:806, para. 92.
48 See also K. Lenaerts, ‘Kooperation und Spannung im Verhältnis von EuGH und nationalen 
Verfassungsgerichten’ (2015) 50 Europarecht 3.
49 See Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-650/13 Delvigne, EU:C:2015:363, para. 98 (holding that 
‘elections to the European Parliament by direct universal suff rage meant at all events that the 
composition of that chamber would be the image and refl ection of that of the parliaments of the 
Member States.’).
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suff rage in a free and secret ballot. Th at is so even in respect of EU citizens who are 
nationals. Th is shows that EU citizenship is linked to the democratic governance of 
the EU. As political actors, EU citizens who eff ectively participate in elections to the 
European Parliament contribute to strengthening the democratic credentials of the 
EU. Th us, the political dimension of EU citizenship is not only about rights, but also 
about ensuring that representative democracy at EU level is eff ective and, most 
importantly, legitimate.
Moreover, Delvigne illustrates the fact that the scope of the political rights 
attaching to the status of EU citizen may not be expanded via judicial interpretation, 
notably by incorporating fundamental rights into that status. In particular, the scope 
of Article 20(2)(b) TFEU is limited to giving concrete expression to the principle of 
non-discrimination on grounds of nationality as applied to the right to vote and to 
stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament. Consequently, that 
provision may not, as the ECJ ruled in Eman and Sevinger, be relied upon by an EU 
citizen against the Member State of which he is a national.
As interpreted in Delvigne, the political dimension of EU citizenship is respectful 
of the constitutional framework set out in the Treaties. Th is is because the ECJ 
grounded the obligation to ensure that members of the European Parliament are 
elected by direct universal suff rage in a free and secret ballot in the EU principle of 
representative democracy – as given concrete expression in Article 1(3) of the 1976 Act 
and Article 14(3) TEU –. It did so, whilst leaving the scope of Article 20(2)(b) TFEU 
untouched. Since the national measure at issue ‘implemented’ that obligation within 
the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, the ECJ was right to examine whether that 
measure complied with Article 52(1) of the Charter. Th is shows that, contrary to what 
an incorporation doctrine “à l’européenne” would have entailed, the ECJ gave impetus 
to the political dimension of EU citizenship without extending in any way the 
competences of the EU as defi ned in the Treaties.
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